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Plato
Plato’s Apology Wiki Plato’s Apologyi is an account of the defense given by Socrates at his trial. In it, Socrates attempts (rather hopelessly) to portray himself as the misunderstood model citizen of Athens. He describes the exemplar citizen as one who obeys the gods by pursuing virtue above all and improving others by persuading them to pursue virtue as well. The Athenians, however, see Socrates more as an agent of destruction to the prevailing social order, and deserving of punishment for being a bad citizen. There are many questions that emerge from grappling with how Socrates arrives at the positions he presents at trial and why he has ended up facing capital charges. For example, should all citizens model themselves after Socrates, or if not, what does the ideal citizen consist of? Did the Athenians have a rational basis for wanting Socrates punished? Is conformity itself a civic virtue, or if not, what are the prudent limits of nonconformity? The event of Socrates' death is mostly remembered today as the silencing of a truth teller by a democratic society driven by emotion rather than reason. It is also the quintessential example of philosopher persecution, the likes of which occurs in societies throughout history. This article seeks to first of all explain both sides of the trial, both that of Athens and Socrates. Subsequently there is one section on the political problems raised by the text and another section on the relative importance of these problems in today's society. ' ' Why Athens Thinks Socrates is a Bad Citizen In the Apology, the citizens of Athens are trying Socrates on the charges of worshipping false gods and corrupting the youth. Interestingly, the text is uniquely lacking in the sort of back-and-forth dialogue typically found in the works of Plato. Thus, much of what we know about the concerns of the Athenians in this text is relayed to the reader through Socrates himself. Additionally, Socrates was Plato's teacher, so the account is likely quite biased. This does not, however, greatly inhibit a basic and reasonable understanding of the Athenians' position. Evidently, one of the primary accusers is a man named Meletus who is quoted as saying that Socrates "intentionally" corrupts and deteriorates the youth (455). Socrates verifies at least that he did keep company with young people, and he had something of a following amongst them. He claims that young people follow him around because "they like to hear the cross-examination of the pretenders of wisdom" (462). This likely reveals exactly what the Athenians have a problem with. Socrates is making it look like, in the eyes of the young people following him, that the authorities are wrongheaded. At the very least, Socrates is creating an anti-establishment faction within the city that would not otherwise exist, and that faction is certainly going to be doubtful of what the authorities claim to be true. Meletus also says that Socrates is a "complete atheist," and that "he says the sun is stone, and the moon earth" (456). What exactly the Athenians considered to be the proper beliefs and actions of a pious person is not made clear, but the sun and moon seem to warrant serious respect which Socrates may not have duly paid. Another point is that it was largely the purview of the poets to describe to the people who the gods were and what they were like. By simply questioning the poets (which he did), Socrates strikes at the root of religious orthodoxy. Socrates' undermining the authority of many trusted and revered individuals in the city is perhaps the greatest factor contributing to his ultimate demise. Many of the most revered people, such as politicians, poets and sophists, would indeed be publicly humiliated during an encounter with Socrates in this regard. It is not surprising that representatives of some of these groups lead the accusations against Socrates at his trial: Meletus (poets), Anytus (craftsmen), and Lycon (rhetoricians) (453). It is not only important to note that these respected people had been embarrassed, but everyone who believed in their teachings were then left questioning themselves. Socrates thus finds himself at the mercy of a very confused and irritated (if not resentful) multitude whose beliefs have been threatened. Why Socrates Thinks he is a Good Citizen Socrates describes the city as being analogous to a big and sort of lazy animal that needs to be constantly coaxed by uncomfortable stimulation toward virtue. According to Socrates, “the state is like a great and noble steed who is tardy in his motions owing to his very size, and requires to be stirred into life” (460). The role Socrates takes upon himself is that of the “gadfly,” irritating all those members of the city who are living a life of falsehood by confronting them (460). There are many implications to this conception of the city and proper role of the citizens. First, citizens need to be activated and awakened in order to steer the direction of the city toward the good because being otherwise passive will result in an erosion of virtue in the city. The good of the city, however, can only be pursued if there is a correct understanding of what the good is (a common vision). This understanding can only be arrived at through the practice of philosophy, the process of thereby removing false opinions and clearing the way for true knowledge. The big question is then will this stirring up of the city ultimately be good for the city as Socrates intends? He argues that it is the desire for self-improvement on behalf of the citizens that has the best effect of steering the city toward the good. Altogether, this means that wisdom must be attained and combined with a willingness to challenge the unexamined opinions of others. The most basic, foundational step for becoming a good citizen, according to the defense given by Socrates, is to care seriously about virtue. The philosopher is shown to be best fit to extol virtue, for even if he does not know exactly what virtue is he does know that it is a necessary component of the good life. Socrates dedicates his life to asking his fellow citizens “O my friend, why do you, who are a citizen of the great and mighty and wise city of Athens, care so much about laying up the greatest amount of money and honor and reputation, and so little about wisdom and truth and the greatest improvement of the soul, which you never regard or heed at all? Are you not ashamed of this?” (459). A great part of caring about virtue is thus not caring about the pleasures that most people pursue: the pleasures of the body. Money, honor, and reputations are largely byproducts of chance and a neglect of virtue in favor of self-interest. The benefits of the soul, however, can only be achieved by a commitment to truth. This commitment is possible for nearly anyone who desires it, and it is more dependent on a person’s effort than the caprices of chance. Once a person is aroused to caring about virtue, then a meaningful and edifying conversation about virtue can take place. This is most important, as Socrates later proclaims in the text “the greatest good of man is daily to converse about virtue” (466). Socrates is so settled on this point that his final wish at the end of the Apology is that, to his sons, his friends “trouble them, as I have troubled you, if they seem to care about riches, or anything, more than about virtue” (470). There are a whole host of other instances in the text showing that learning about virtue is a panacea for nearly all of societies’ ills. Let the quotes provided here suffice it to say that virtue is not only what citizenship, but living itself, is all about to Socrates. Some of the virtues are more evident in Socrates’ speech than others. We know that the ancient Greeks revered wisdom, justice, courage, and temperance as the four cardinal virtues, and Socrates follows them closely in his references to virtue and the good. He says that he will not stand in front of his judges with his family and plead for compassion because such an act would violate the demands of wisdom, justice and courage, and thus be shameful: “my reason simply is, that I feel such conduct to be discreditable to myself, and you, and the whole state . . . And if those among you who are said to be superior in wisdom and courage, and any other virtue, demean themselves in this way, how shameful is their conduct!” (464). The justice that Socrates is seeking cannot be tarnished with emotional pleas. If he were to be acquitted based on compassion then he would be implicitly acknowledging that the truth was not on his side, or less important to him than was his acquittal. Because only the truth can provide true justice, an acquittal based on emotion and compassion would, in fact, be an injustice. To accept an injustice, for Socrates, would be to expose his soul to ugliness while his only avowed concern is the beauty of his soul achieved through virtue. Therefore, Socrates has to be judged on the facts alone if he is to have the courage of his convictions. Socrates accepted the hatred and ill will he inspired in his fellow citizens in exchange for obedience to what he imagined as being the word of God. He reflects that “being not unconscious of the enmity which I provoked, and I lamented and feared this: but necessity was laid upon me, --the word of God, I thought, ought to be considered first” (451). The message here is twofold. First, Socrates is leading by example in his piety in both word and deed. He is proclaiming that he is obeying God and provides as evidence the risks and unpleasantness he endured as a result. The second lesson is that God’s highest concern, at least for Socrates, is for him to fight against false opinions, particularly the common opinion that one has a great deal of knowledge. Acknowledging one’s own ignorance not only elevates the wisdom of God by comparison—and thus strengthening piety—but also has the effect of minimizing one’s capacity to be unjust. Injustice cannot exist without the exploitation of false opinion just as true knowledge lays the foundation for justice. Thus Socrates does have a convincing argument that he believes in the divine, but whether that belief is orthodox to Athenian religion as received from the poets is doubtful. Political Problems of Socratic Citizenship The topic of education, particularly of the youth, is another important topic in Plato’s Apology because it comprises that quest for truth that leads to virtue and a beautiful soul. In Athens, the education of children was the responsibility of the parents who could afford to pay for a teacher. Socrates, however, is very critical of teachers who accept money in exchange for their teaching because there then exists a tension between the art of truth seeking and the art of making money. He speaks disparagingly of “Gorgias of Leontium, and Prodicus of Ceos, and Hippias of Elis, who go the round of the cities, and are able to persuade the young men to leave their own citizens, by whom they might be taught for nothing, and come to them, whom they not only pay, but are thankful if they may be allowed to pay them” (449). Socrates here seems to be implying that the best education is attainable to a person by simply seeking the truth, conversing with his neighbors and not spending money at all on self-proclaimed teachers. The emphasis on self-reliance here exudes impracticality from a political perspective, particularly with the implied suggestion that all the education one needs is in one's own backyard. It is possible that such an approach to education could be possible in societies structured a certain way, but not elsewhere. Children are particularly susceptible to false opinions according to Socrates. He argues that it is due to this fact that the slanders against him have been so effective: “But far more dangerous are these, who began when you were children, and took possession of your minds with their falsehoods” (448). The word choice in this passage is important. The people who persuaded the children of these slanders are “dangerous” and the minds of the children were taken “possession of.” Because it has been shown that Socrates is less concerned with his own life than the virtue of the city, the danger must be directed more to the later than the former. Socrates, representing the perfect citizen, is seemingly most important as an idea. His slanderers have thus diminished the children’s inclination to ever care for what Socrates represents: virtue and truth. One must decide for one’s self whether this seeming travesty persists today, and who the slanderers most consist of. When one hears the term “imprinting” the idea generally comes to mind of a freshly hatched duckling identifying as its mother the first living thing that cares for it. Socrates, surely unfamiliar with such a concept as we understand it today, seems to have in mind a similar effect when it comes to ideas pressed upon children. Speaking to his accusers of the slanders against him, he says that they were made “in days when you were impressible—in childhood, or perhaps in youth” (448). This highlights the importance of educating the young properly because false knowledge will persist stubbornly in the mind when it is introduced early in life. Frequently in the course of his speech Socrates refers to the fact that he does not have enough time at the trial to counter these opinions that are tantamount to indoctrinations. Who exactly the right teacher is, or how to develop good teachers, however, is left largely unanswered. There are pieces of an answer in Socrates’ instance on the need to practice philosophy and discuss virtue every day in the city. Unfortunately, there are not any clear institutional suggestions to perpetuate this kind of social activity presented in the Apology. Contemporary Relevance The modern public education system has risen to meet the demands of an educated citizenry in western style democratic societies. Interestingly, the curriculum in American public education has gradually moved away from the classics, which take up the issues of republican virtue, in favor of liberal arts. What has emerged is a soft civic virtue where patriotism and nationalism largely hold together the moral fabric of American society. This set up actually worked rather well in the wake of 9/11 when the country seemed to emerge from the crisis even stronger than it was before. There are a few additional lessons in the Apology that are extremely relevant to American society today. First is that the foundation for the entire Socratic conception of citizenship is that there is a duality between the body and the soul. If there is no soul, then there is no other benefit other than benefits of the body, and hedonism (if it feels good, do it) becomes a compelling ethical theory. However, Socrates could be right. Since there is no empirical evidence either way, the odds begin at 50-50. Perhaps there is a soul that is made more beautiful or more ugly depending on the choices we make, and this will have a major influence in the pleasantness of the afterlife. If this were true, society ought to be arranged around the sole objective of preparing for death, but that, of course, is an absurd notion to nearly everyone. Yet, could it be just as absurd as the before thought absurdity of the Earth revolving around the Sun? Secondly, the dangers of being in a minority are highlighted in a particularly profound way. Socrates was put to death on dubious charges, and such a thing would not likely happen today. However, does the majority in America destroy at least the reputations of individuals that challenge its beliefs? Does not “the majority” in modern American society wield an incredible amount of power? And cannot the same base passions sway the opinions of the majority in America as they did in ancient Athens, feelings such as jealousy and fear? Many would probably agree that this is indeed the case, but the average American reveres democracy as something without risk or defect. This is something taught to us as children, which is an interesting point in light of the section above on childhood education. Socrates would certainly see this as a grave danger, for how can a people resist a vice they do not even know they have? ---- i (from Plato. The Republic and other Works. Trans. B. Jowett. Garden City: Anchor Books, 1973)